Abstract-Constructing efficient (Hierarchical) identity based signature/signcryption ((H)IBS/IBSC) schemes in the standard model with full security remain as open problems for a long time. Ren et al. constructed efficient (H)IBS/IBSC schemes with full security without random oracle in IS-DPE'07 and Chinacrypt'08, . They claimed their schemes can be proved to simultaneously achieve high efficiency, short public parameters and a tight reduction. But we shall show their schemes are not secure. Furthermore, we give improvements to these schemes which can resist the proposed attack. Proxy re-encryption is a primitive which allows the transformation from A's ciphertext to be B's ciphertext by using proxies, without the proxy knowing the corresponding plaintexts or secret keys of A or B. Proxy broadcast re-encryption aims at transforming ciphertext from one user to a group, which is a generalization of proxy re-encryption. Recently, Sun et al. proposed a CCA-secure unidirectional proxy broadcast re-encryption in the standard model, we also show their scheme has some flaws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background. Computer systems in modern time are always in large scale, decentralized, and heterogeneous environments. Inevitably they are often facing the diverse threats such as swarms , viruses, identity theft and session jack etc. Cryptography research seeks to help the computers and networks more safer, more dependable and less vulnerable to those attacks. In this paper, we will cryptanalyze three signature/signacryption schemes, which were proposed to ensure the authenticaiton/confidentiality of the messages flowed on internet. Therefore, our result can be seen as good examples to indicate that computational intelligence engineers should be more careful on using cryptographic schemes. Some of the cryptographic schemes maybe seem to be secure but actually are not secure at all. Our negative results could tell the engineers cryptographic schemes always can be
The second author is the corresponding author. This paper is an extended work of [29] , [30] and supported by the National Natural Science broken in unexpected way, and thus they should be more cautious on which cryptographic scheme can be employed in practical applications.
IBE/IBS. In 1984, Shamir introduced the primitive of identity based encryption/signature (IBE/IBS), which aimed at avoiding the burden certificate management in traditional public key infrastructure [1] . In the IBE/IBS system, the public key of the users is their identity information (e.g., name). Hence the public key can be implicit authenticated by the owner of 'correct' private key. Thus the management of certificates can be avoided. Boneh and Franklin demonstrated the first practical IBE scheme in 2001 by relying on bilinear pairings [2] . In 2004, Boneh and Boyen gave the BB 1 IBE and BB 2 IBE, namely two new efficient selective identity secure IBE schemes in the standard model [3] . Later IBE scheme in the standard model with full security (the attacker can adaptively attack any identity) were proposed by Boneh and Boyen, and Waters also proposed new somehow tightly fully secure IBE scheme by using Waters' hash function [4] , [5] . At Eurocrypt'06, based on a strong assumption, Gentry proposed a new efficient IBE scheme with tight security reduction without random oracle [6] . On the other hand, efficient identity based signature schemes have been successfully constructed much early before 2011. Some other constructions of IBS scheme can be found in [7] - [9] .
IBSC. In 1997, Zheng et al. proposed the concept of Signcryption, which aimed at achieving both encryption and signature in one logic step, while avoiding separate encryption and signature [10] . The first ID-based signcryption (IBSC) scheme was proposed by MaloneLee [11] , by using the technique of Hess's signature [8] with modified BF IBE. Later an improved identity-based signcryption scheme was given by Chen and MaloneLee [12] . Yuen et al. constructed a provably secure signcrypton scheme in the standard model in 2005 with its security being proved in a weaker " sample model" rather than "selective-ID" model. HIBE/HIBS. In practice one always face organizations with hierarchical structures, thus we need the higher-level authority can delegate keys to its lowerlevel sub-authorities. In hierarchy identity based encryption/signature (HIBE/HIBS), the identities represents by vectors, while messages are encrypted/signed for these vectors. In Eurocrypt'02, the first HIBE/HIBS was proposed by Horwitz and Lynn [13] , and the first fully functional HIBE/HIBS scheme was constructed by Gentry and Silverberg [14] in Asiacrypt'02. The first provable secure HIBS scheme in the random oracle was proposed by Chow et al. [15] in 2004. But their scheme has this feature: signature length grows linearly with the hierarchy depth. In 2005, Yuen et al. [16] gave a HIBS scheme with constant signature length in the selective-ID model in the standard model.
PRE.In 1998, Blaze et al. introduced the primitive of proxy re-encryption (PRE) [17] . Proxy re-encryption can transform the ciphertexts under Alice to be another ciphertext under Bob by using semi-trusted proxy. later Ateniese et al. proposed a few new PRE schemes and demonstrated its interesting applications [18] . Since then, PRE schemes received much attention by the researchers. In AisaCCS'09, Weng et al. [19] proposed the concept of conditional proxy re-encryption, which can enable the delegator fine-grained delegate his decryption right to the delegatee. Later, they revised the definition and security model for CPRE, and constructed a more efficient one [20] . Broadcast encryption is a primitive aimed at one-tomany secure message delivering and researchers often try to extending other cryptographic primitives to the broadcast scenario to solve the corresponding security problems in the broadcasting enviroment [27] , [28] . In ACISP'09, Chu et al. then generalized the conditional proxy reencryption to the broadcast setting, and constructed a provable secure conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption (CPBRE) scheme [21] .
Our Contribution. In ISDPE'07, Ren et al. [23] proposed efficient fully secure IBS/IBSC schemes without random oracle. Later in Chinacrypt'08, they [24] also proposed a fully secure HIBS scheme in the standard model which can achieve short parameters, high efficiency and a tight reduction. However, in this paper we give attacks to show their schemes are not secure. Furthermore, we give improvements to these schemes. Recently Sun et al. proposed a CCA-secure unidirectional proxy broadcast re-encryption in the standard model. But we show their scheme also has some flaws.
Organization. We organize the paper as follows. In section 2, we first show Ren et al.'s IBS scheme is not secure, then give our improved scheme. In section 3, we first show Ren et al.'s IBSC scheme is not secure yet, then give our improved scheme. In section 4, we show Ren et al.'s HIBS scheme is not secure and then fix it. In section 5, we show Sun et al.'s scheme has some flaws. In the last section, we give our conclusion.
II. IBS SCHEME

A. Definition and Security Model for IBS Scheme
An IBS scheme consists of the following algorithms: 1) Setup: When given a security parameter k, the PKG generates (msk, param). msk is the master secret key and param is the corresponding public parameter. 2) KeyGen: When given an identity ID, the PKG generates the corresponding private key SK ID and gives it to its owner in a secure way. 3) Sign: when given the private key SK ID and a message M , it outputs a signature σ. 4) Verify: when given the signer's identity ID, a message M and signature σ, it outputs "Valid" if σ is a valid signature of M under ID, param. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Definition 1: The existential unforgeability against adaptive identity and adaptive chosen message attack for IBS (EU-ID-CMA) scheme is defined in the following game. We first define the following oracles: 
p which is the private key of PKG. The PKG randomly chooses h i ∈ G 1 , i = 0, 1, 2. The public parameters are param = (g, g 1 , h 0 , h 1 , h 2 ) and the master secret key is msk = α. 2) KeyGen: For a user U with identity ID ∈ Z * p , the PKG randomly chooses r ID ∈ Z * p , and outputs
For signing a message m ∈ Z * p , U randomly chooses s ∈ Z * p and computes
s so the signature of m is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , r ID ).
4) Verify:
The receiver verifies whether
this equation holds, it is a valid signature. Otherwise, it is an invalid signature. Correctness:
C. Attack to IBS Scheme
Observe the verifying equation:
From this, we can modify the signature to be
which is a valid signature for m . Concretely, assume the target identity is ID * , the attacker A attacks as follows:
1) A queries a signature on m of ID * to the challenger B, B will return σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , r ID ).
2) Now A modifies the signature to be
The public parameters and the master secret key are
To a user U with identity ID ∈ Z * p , the PKG randomly chooses r ID ∈ Z * p , and computes
To sign a message m ∈ Z * p , U randomly chooses s ∈ Z * p and computes
so the signature of m is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , r ID ).
4) Verify:
If σ can pass the above verification, it is a valid signature. Otherwise, it is an invalid signature.
Remark 1: In this scheme,
sm . This little modification can resist the above attack, for this time
2 , r ID = r ID can not pass the verified equation. Any modification on σ 2 will be detected.
III. IBSC SCHEME
A. Definition and Security Model for IBSC Scheme
An IBSC scheme is defined by the following four algorithms: 1) Setup: When given a security parameter k, the PKG generates (msk,param) where msk is the randomly generated master secret key and param is the corresponding public parameter. 2) Keygen: When given an identity ID, the PKG computes the corresponding private key SK ID and gives it to its owner in a secure way. 
Definition 2:
We say that an IBSC scheme has the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks property (IND-IBSC-CCA) if no P.P.T adversary has a non-negligeable advantage in the following game.
1) The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and sends the system parameters to the adversary. 2) The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of requests:
• 
1) The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and gives the system parameters to the adversary. The adversary's advantage is its probability of victory.
B. Review of Ren et al.'s IBSC Scheme
Here we review Ren et al.'s IBSC scheme in [23] : 1) Setup: G 1 , G 2 are groups of order p where p be a large prime number. e :
p is a collision resistent hash function. The public parameters is param = (g, g 1 , h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , H) and the master secret key is msk = α. 2) KeyGen: For a user U with identity ID ∈ Z * p , the PKG randomly chooses r ID ∈ Z * p , and outputs
For a message m ∈ G 2 , U randomly chooses s ∈ Z * p and computes
the signcryption of m is c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , σ 1 , H(m), r ID ).
4) Unsigncrypt:
a) The receiver verifies whether
if it is true, c is a true signcryption. b) Decrypts m = c 3 e(c 1
C. Attack to IBSC Scheme
The attacker A breaks the unforgeability as follows, assume the target identity is ID * , 1) A queries a signcryption on m of ID * to the challenger B, B will return c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , σ 1 , H(m), r ID ). 2) Now A modifies the signcryption ciphertext to be
where m is a randomly message chosen from the plaintext place.
Clearly, this will break the unforgeability of the signcryption scheme. Assume the target identity is ID * , the attacker A breaks the confidentiality as follows 
where m is a randomly chosen message. 3) A queries c to the unsigncryption oracle of ID * , and he will get (m * )
H(m ) which is enough to get m * (A knows m , H(m * )), for the following
Clearly, this breaks the confidentiality of this signcryption scheme.
D. Improved IBSC Scheme 1) Setup: Let p be a large prime number, G 1 , G 2 are groups of order p. e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map, g is a generator of G 1 , g 1 = g α , where α ∈ Z * p . α is the private key of PKG. The PKG randomly chooses h i ∈ G 1 , i = 0, l, 2. H : G 2 → Z * p is a collision resistent hash function. Let H : {0, 1} * × G 1 → Z * p be a hash function. The public parameters and the master secret key are param = (g, g 1 , h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , H, H ) , msk = α 2) KeyGen: To a user U with identity ID ∈ Z * p , the PKG randomly chooses r ID ∈ Z * p , and computes
To signcrypt a message m ∈ G 2 , U randomly chooses s ∈ Z * p and computes
if it is true, c is a true signcryption.
Remark 2: In this scheme,
sH(m) . This little modification can resist the above attack. Any modification on σ 2 will be detected.
IV. HIBS SCHEME
A. Definition and Security Model for HIBS Scheme
The following four algorithms express a l-level HIBS scheme: 1) Setup: With a security parameter k, the PKG generates (msk, param) where msk is the randomly generated master secret key and param is the corresponding public parameter. 2) KeyGen: With an identity vector ID (where ID ≤ l), the PKG outputs the corresponding private key SK ID and gives it to its owner in a secure way. Note its prefix identities can also generate the private key SK ID . 3) Sign: With the private key of the signer ID, SK ID and a message M , it outputs a signature σ corresponding to param.
4) Verify:
With the signer identity vector ID, a message M and signature σ, it outputs "Valid" if σ is a valid signature of M corresponding to ID, param. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Definition 4: We define the following oracles:
• KGO(ID): With input ID (where ID ≤ l), the Key Generation Oracle will output the secret key SK ID corresponding to msk.
• SO(ID, M ): With input signer ID (where ID ≤ l) and message M , the Signing Oracle will output a signature σ such that V erif y(ID, M, σ) = V alid. We define the existential unforgeability against adaptive identity and adaptive chosen message attack for HIBS (EU-ID-CMA), as in the following game. A wins if he completes the Game with V alid = V erif y(ID * , M * , σ * ). Its advantage is its probability of winning.
B. Review of Ren et al.'s HIBS Scheme
Here we review Ren et al.'s HIBS scheme in [24] : 1) Setup: Let G 1 , G 2 are groups of order p which is a large prime number. e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map, g is a generator of G 1 , g 1 = g α , where α ∈ Z * p . l is the maximum number of levels in the HIBS, The PKG randomly chooses h i ∈ G 1 , i = 0, · · · , l, H : G 1 → Z * p is a hash function randomly chosen from hash family. The public parameter is param = (g, g 1 , h 0 , · · · , h l , H) and the master secret key is msk = α. 2) KeyGen: To a user U with identity ID = (ID 1 , · · · , ID i ) ∈ (Z * p ) i , the PKG randomly chooses r, r i ∈ Z * p , where H(g ri ) = α, and computes
and abandons r i . The private key of U is
The private key can also be generated by its parent (ID 1 , · · · , ID i−1 ) having the secret key
where r i = r i−1 .
3) Sign: U randomly chooses s ∈ Z * p to sign a message m ∈ Z * p and computes
so the signature of m is σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 ). 4) Verify: The receiver verifies whether
holds. It is a valid signature if σ can pass the above verification. Otherwise, it is an invalid signature.
C. Attack to HIBS Scheme
Assume the target identity is a first level identity
, the adversary A attacks as follows: 1) First he queries the Key Generation Oracle on a first level identity ID 1 where ID 1 = ID * 1 to the challenger B, and B will return
A can derive a "private key"
2) Then A "signs" message m by this "private key", he will get the signature
3) A modifies this signature to be
we will show this is a valid signature for
The first equation for verifying will be satisfied.
e(σ 2 , g) = e(σ 3 , g 1 ).
The second equation for verifying will also be satisfied.
D. Improved HIBS Scheme 1) Setup: Let p be a large prime number, G 1 , G 2 are groups of order p. e :
l is the maximum number of levels in the HIBS, The PKG randomly chooses h i ∈ G 1 , i = 0, · · · , l, H : G 1 → Z * p is a Hash function randomly chosen from a family of universal oneway Hash functions. Let H :
p be a hash function. The public parameters and the master secret key are
and abandons r i . So the private key of U is
where r i = r i−1 . 3) Sign: To sign a message m ∈ Z * p , U randomly chooses s ∈ Z * p and computes
If σ can pass the above verification, it is a valid signature. Otherwise, it is an invalid signature. Remark 3: In this scheme,
s . This little modification can resist the above attack. Any modification on σ 2 , σ 3 , σ 4 , σ 5 will be detected.
V. PRBE SCHEME A. Definition and Security Model for PBRE Scheme
Here we review the definition and security model of PBRE schemes. A PBRE scheme consists of the following algorithms: 1) Setup: When given a security parameter, outputs both the master public parameters params, and the master key mk which is kept private. 2) KeyGen: On input mk and an identity I as input, this algorithm generates a secret key sk I associated with I. 3) Encrypt: This algorithm takes pk, a message M , and an identity I as input, and generates the second level ciphertext C I , which can be re-encrypted by the proxy. 4) RKGen: On input master key mk, and receiver set S, the delegator's identity I, he non-interactively generates the re-encryption key rk I→S and outputs it. 5) Reencrypt: On input a second level ciphertext C under identity I, and a re-encryption key rk I→S , outputs a first level re-encrypted ciphertext C S . 6) Decrypt 2 : On input a second level ciphertext C I under identity I with secret key sk I , if I ∈ S, decrypts the ciphertext C I and outputs M , otherwise output ⊥. 7) Decrypt 2 : On input a first level ciphertext C S under identity I with secret key sk I , if I ∈ S, decrypts the re-encrypted ciphertext C S and outputs M , otherwise output ⊥.
Definition 5: The security of an unidirectional IBP-BRE scheme is defined according to the following games: 1) Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives pk to the adversary A. 2) Phase 1: Adversary A makes the following queries.
a) Extract: A submits an identity I for a KeyGen query, the challenger gives A the secret key sk I . b) RKExtract: A submits an pair (I, S), the challenger gives the re-encryption key rk I→S c) Reencrypt: A submits a ciphertext C I , the challenger gives the adversary the re-encrypted ciphertext C s = Reencrypt(C I , rk I→S where rk I→S = RKGen(sk I , S) and sk I = KeyGen(mk, I). d) Decrypt: A submits a ciphertext C I encrypted for I, the challenger gives the corresponding plaintext M = Decrypt(C T , sk I ), where sk I = KeyGen(mk, I).
3) Challenge: A submits a challenge identity I * and two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 to C. If the queries Extract(I * ), RKExtract(I * , S) and Extract(S) for any identity set S are never made, then C flips a random coin θ and passes the ciphertext C * = Encrypt(params, M θ , I) to A. 4) Phase2: Phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that A cannot make the following queries: a) Extract(I * ), RKExtract(I * , S) and Extract(S) for any identity set S; b) RKExtract(I * , S) and Decrypt(C S , S) for any identity set S and any ciphertext S S ; 5) Guess: A outputs its guess θ of θ. The advantage of A in this game is defined as Adv A = |P r[θ = θ] − 1/2|.
This is the security model for the second level ciphertext, and the security model for first level ciphertext is similar as the second level one except this time the adversary can query any re-encryption keys, and the first level ciphertext is provided for adversary A in the challenge phase. The more carefully security model can refer to [21] . VI. CONCLUSION In this paper, we cryptanalyze and improve three signature/signacryption schemes which proposed by Ren et al. at ISDPE'07 and Chinacrypt'08 [23] , [24] . Probably the recent "dual system encryption" [25] , [26] technique can help to construct new novel efficient (H)IBS/IBSC schemes in the standard model. Furthermore, we point out sun et al.'s PBRE scheme [22] can not be correct, and we need more considerations for constructing efficient PBRE schemes.
